Afghanistan's Agony
Seems President Hamid Karzai got a bit of a pasting in the United Nations, a kind of censure for work done to date by his administration. Not moving very far up the scale toward all the indices of success that five years of UN-approved and NATO-supported assistance might warrant, in their view. Still, one must give this embattled man his due; his is an anxiously, heart-troubling work sheet of accomplishments.Not at all helped by his parliamentary colleagues, some of whom cannot see beyond their own history as war lords, nor their current preoccupation with supporting illegal poppy-growing for the riches that fall into their laps. Afghans are fighters. Historically respected for their courage and determination. They've lived under centuries of attack by countries as disparate as Britain and Russia, both historical empire-builders.
Not to mention more recent episodes of attempted occupation and subjugation. They're a fierce mountain-tribal people. Proud, and insistent on their ability to rule themselves. A geographic hot-house of opportunities for the formulation of paramilitary-political invaders, ultra-religious marauders, an unfortunate combination that resulted in a recent and unsuccessful Russian invasion. Whose wake led to the Taliban installation.
So here we are, the Taliban ousted, then the rag-tag remnants ignored and left to lick their wounds in their inaccessible mountain redoubts, where they finally re-armed and re-invented their techniques, strategies and followers. And Canada, among other nations, is in the unenviable position of fighting off the resurgent Taliban, helping to train Afghan militia and police, assisting in reconstruction.
And like many other NATO-aligned countries whose citizens are broodingly unhappy about their armed forces' presence in far-off Afghanistan, faced with the decision of staying or leaving, the job not yet accomplished. That famed warrior culture is not yet prepared to have the work of routing the Taliban completely handed off to them. International aid is still required to help build civil infrastructure.
And poor Afghan farmers growing poppy crops that yield the best return for their efforts remain beleaguered by an American force whose administration remains wedded to drug eradication. When they, Canadian and all other allied forces involved in the region should recognize that they will lose increasing numbers of poor Afghans to the lure of the Taliban should this arc of eradication continue.
The Senlis Council advocates, knowingly and aptly, that this war on drugs will not work here; not at this time, not in this place. A poor country which can offer its agricultural segment in remote geographical provinces no support whatever cannot afford to destabilize their local economy, sending them into the hands of the Taliban who threaten the farmers on the one hand, if they don't grow poppies and share the proceeds, while the occupying troops on the other, destroy their crops.
The only reasonable option is one that has been tried before, many years before, with Turkey. India and Turkey now grow legitimate poppy crops for opiate and medicinal use, and the same should be done with Afghanistan. Making the growing of such crops legal, enabling them to reliably recompense the farmers whose livelihoods depend upon these crops. There is a large world market for medical opiates.
Their alienation, a result of poverty and frustrated anger against NATO's International Security Assistance Force will be signed, sealed and delivered into Taliban hands should the present insistence on eradication continue. If the international community wants Afghanistan to succeed in its straining trajectory toward independent self-capability, a reasonable response to the needs of its agricultural community must be realized.
A comfortably assured livelihood will do much to engender trust in the ISAF presence and purpose. A moderately self-sustaining community represents one more likely to recognize the good work foreign forces are performing on behalf of the country's future. There would be less likelihood of locals turning their heads away neutrally when IEDs are placed on highways killing and injuring foreign military.
Knowledge of insurgent weapons caches will be likelier to be revealed by local village heads when they make the connection between an assured standard of living and the presence of international representatives doing their utmost to protect their way of life.
It's called reasonable accommodation - and it extends its utility both ways.
Labels: Realities, World Crises
posted by Pieface @ Tuesday, September 25, 2007
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