Syria's Future
"Conflict like this is naturally going to radicalize the population. There's no doubt that ideas you wouldn't normally see inside Syria -- prior to the revolution -- are gaining increasing sympathy."The various clan and tribal rebel militias representing the majority Syrian Sunni population began by insisting they could manage on their own, thank you very much. They had no need of outside intervention, anything like what happened in Syria when NATO stepped in under the umbrella of the UN, to cover the backs of the Libyan rebels with their overflights and their war jets bombing the Libyan military. The Syrian rebels were confident; it was their war and they would prevail.
"There was a nucleus of jihadist activities that really flourished under the Assad regime and were aided by Syrian intelligence forces."
"If Assad were to fall quickly before there is any significant support for [secular] opposition groups, I think Jabhat al-Nusra would be the most powerful organization. I think they have the capability to implement their rule and start running the country in ways where it would not be a democratic Syria."
"Originally it was very much indigenous [to Syria], but I think that has largely changed. Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other al-Qaeda affiliates have taken over the leadership structures making Jabhat al-Nusra much, much more extreme and more ideologically tied to al-Qaeda discourse."
Elizabeth O'Bagy, Institute for the Study of War
But then, things are never as simple as sheer declarations deem them to be. The rebels were not in possession of the sophisticated weapons that formed the munitions of a well-equipped army; they were no match for a regime that sent out war planes and helicopter war ships to bomb any area it suspected was a stronghold of the rebels. And so it was decided that it would be very nice and appreciated as well if the United States might wish to involve itself.
It had no such desire. Having become abundantly clear that the warning of background terrorist activity issued by Syria's President al-Assad was not as delusional as it seemed from his extravagant claims. Arming the rebels would mean that those arms would make their way to the Islamists. NATO and the U.S. were stung before, in Afghanistan and in Libya, and had no wish to compound the issue to their decided detriment; the rebels were on their own.
Not entirely, of course, since Saudi Arabia and Qatar, belligerently opposed to Syria's Baath rule but reluctant to assemble their own troops or those of the combined Arab League to aid the rebels, have supported them with funding and arms. But the regime and the rebels appear well matched, so much so that there are more frequent check-mates than advances with one capturing an area and the other retreating, then the situation reversing.
It is the presence of the Islamists, the jihadists, that troubles the onlookers. Many have come from Libya, from Pakistan, Afghanistan, battle-hardened and prepared to launch their version of Islam on as wide a scale as possible. And then there is Bashar al-Assad's clever schemes coming back to haunt him; the home-grown Syrian jihadists whom he had previously encouraged over the border into Iraq, to fight there, instead of at home.
"It was a strategy of deporting your jihadists and hoping they die. There was a rat line of jihadis, weapons and money coming through Syria to the Sunni sections of Iraq in order to bring pain to the Americans. Unfortunately, it has flowed back. The Syrians who survived learned some decent skills in terms of trade craft and combat. If you could survive against [the coalition forces in Iraq], you are in a lot better position to survive against the Syrian army", explained Scott Stewart of Stratfor Global Intelligence.
"They are very disciplined, experienced fighters, much more organized than many in the Free Syrian Army. Since their official formation in [January 2012], Jabhat al Nusra (The Support Front for the People of Syria) has grown, conducting over 700 attacks across the country", stated Aaron Zelin, Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
The success of this home-grown Islamist group has divided Syrians themselves, half of whom are appalled at their stringent ideological social and political programs, the rest of whom are impressed by their highly successful prowess on the battleground, challenging the regime's military. Their Salafist ideology calls for an extension of Sharia law across Syria's borders into neighbouring states.
Their resistance to corruption stands as a stark contrast to the activities of those associated with the rebel groups and represents an admirable characteristic to those who admire the Islamists. "They've taken a very radical ideology and given it popular resonance on the ground. If something is not done to try to stem their influence, you could very well see a Syria dominated by Jabhat al-Nusra in the same way you see Lebanon dominated by Hezbollah", says Ms. O'Bagy.
Labels: Conflict, Islamism, Revolution, Syria
<< Home