Tuesday, November 02, 2010

Airline Security

"It is not the responsibility of the country in which the cargo transits to x-ray or inspect the cargo. This responsibility belongs to the country from where the consignment originates. Furthermore, the explosives discovered were of a sophisticated nature whereby they could not be detected by x-ray screening or trained sniffer dogs. The explosives were only discovered after an intelligence tip off." Qatar Airways spokesperson
That statement will be of great comfort and assurance to al-Qaeda and its expert bombmaker, Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri. Yemen will not be ecstatic, however, about the implications inherent in the sloughing off of any responsibility by others than themselves. Although they will brook no interference in their internal affairs, their sovereign initiatives, their commitment to ousting their own threats, let alone those that threaten the international community.

There will not always be 'intelligence tip-offs'. That this was the case in this particular instance was serendipitous. The cleverly innovative and difficult-to-discern design of these chemical bombs give no comfort to Western security agencies. That al-Qaeda in the Arabia Peninsula hit upon the brilliant idea of infiltrating airline security for the purpose of securing bombs in cargo rather than in passenger luggage ensuring less scrutiny, was slated to emerge.

And now it also occurs to security agencies that there well may have been a previous attack on a cargo carrier that killed several employees which was falsely attributed to accidental causes perhaps mechanical in nature, when in fact it very well might have been the same nefarious bomb maker and his furtive attempt at a practise run. An obviously successful 'practise', since two crew members of a UPS cargo plane died in the Dubai crash a month earlier.

That British security, which was given precise information, was unable to detect the presence of an explosive device until its close and careful scrutiny the second time around, is not particularly assuring. Nor that despite German authorities having been alerted by the Saudis, the shipment in question was allowed to depart for Britain. No reliable diligence or safety measures were adequately undertaken, despite the much-discussed intelligence tip-off.

Lady Luck smiled convincingly on this occasion, and has on previous occasions, but she just might decide to give fumblers the cold shoulder the next time around. If one of the plots succeeded and managed to dispatch a handful of innocent lives, or even a hundred, the impact of the success of the terrorist act would be widespread. Another Fort Hood debacle will only add to al-Qaeda's lustrous reputation.

Achieving mass terror through a discrete episode here and there represents an incalculable disaster. And the airlines themselves have much to lose in the process. They've been through it once before, on an enormously disruptive scale, when air liners were used as lethal weapons to crash down the Twin Towers in New York, and the skies went suddenly quiet, and fear ruled.

The International Air Transport Association is now considering measures to be put into place to monitor air cargo security. Not just when cargo reaches airports, but along every step of the way; responsibility to be widespread. Which will mean delays and additional expenses. Which should be quite satisfying in and of itself to al-Qaeda. There are more ways than one or two to proclaim success.

The unqualified success in fearful intimidation spells jubilation and encouragement for continued attempts at outsmarting the keenest minds and latest technical equipment and formulas for frustrating the concerted attempts of dedicated jihadists. This lethal, unnerving cat-and-mouse game continues.

Labels: , ,

Follow @rheytah Tweet