Biological Warfare
"North Korea is far more likely to use biological weapons than nuclear ones."
"The program is advanced, underestimated and highly lethal."
Andrew C. Weber. U.S. Defense Department
"A nuclear weapons facility has very visible signals to the outside world."
"We can look at it and immediately say, 'Ugh, that's a nuclear reactor'. But the technology for conducting biological weapons research is essentially the same as what keeps a population healthy."
Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr, North Korean military analyst
"If you're a country that feels generally outclassed in conventional weapons, [a lethal microbe such as anthrax might seem like a good way[ to create an outsized amount of damage."
Melissa Hanham, senior research associate, East Asia James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
"Amidst the growing threat of North Korea’s nuclear program, the assassination of Kim Jong-Un’s half-brother via VX nerve agent in February 2017 brought renewed interest in North Korea’s other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs—chemical and biological weapons. If used on a large scale, these weapons can cause not only tens of thousands of deaths, but also create panic and paralyze societies. Nevertheless, the vividness of the nuclear threat has overshadowed other weapons programs, limiting the attention and policy input that they deserve."
"Accurately assessing the threat from North Korea’s biological weapons is challenging. Whereas North Korea has publicly declared its will to become a nuclear power many times, it has been less overt about its intention or capability for biological weapons. BW capabilities are inherently hard to detect and measure. While nuclear programs can be monitored by the number of nuclear tests and the success of missile tests, weaponizing and cultivating pathogens can stay invisible behind closed doors. Moreover, equipment used for BW production are often dual-use for agriculture, making external monitoring and verification virtually impossible. Limited information on North Korea’s BW program leads to a low threat perception that may undermine preparation and response efforts."
"Nonetheless, preparation against BW is urgent and necessary, which will also serve as defense against naturally occurring epidemics that increasingly threaten the 21st century. Military and public health sectors should cooperate to urgently prepare for “dual-response” mechanisms. Components of a well-established 'dual-response' program should include the best possible threat assessment by military and intelligence communities, a strong public health detection and response system, a well-coordinated crisis communication strategy among multiple stakeholders, and compliance from an informed public."
North Korea appears to be pursuing an alternative to mere nuclear weapons threats, turning as well to what analysts describe as more immediate than nuclear arms, in fact. An analysis issued in December of 2018 by the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, California asserts that North Korea is actively collaborating with foreign researchers for the purpose of acquiring biotechnology skills and to build machinery associated with them.
American experts such as Andrew Weber, an official in charge of nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs under then-President Barack Obama are concerned about offensive strikes and biological agents of lethal capacity, in particular the smallpox virus; a third of its victims assured of death. According to analysts, satellite images and Internet scrutiny suggest that bio-technology and germ advances have focused Pyongyang's interests.
The production of germ agents is less costly, and scaled down, as opposed to the creation of nuclear arms. And deadly agents can easily resemble components of harmless vaccines as well as agricultural work, mistaken for them but in actual fact their deadly cousins whose potential deployment could be absolutely catastrophic. Such 'living' weaponry can as well be difficult in detection, creating a challenge to trace and to contain.
That the threat is there, and real is beyond dispute. Yet the secrecy practised by North Korea makes the extent of the threat difficult to assess. Beyond hypothesis at the present time, the country might not be in possession of any biological weapons, merely be in the beginning research mode, with prototypes, considering human testing -- but with the growing capacity to rush into industrial production.
Most nations of the world that had produced biological arms have long since surrendered them as impractical, much less totally immoral. The fact that wind could pick up and carry deadly agents back on their users to infect troops and citizens held as great sway as the impulse to humanitarian rejection. Yet at the present time, according to analysts, the gene revolution could have the effect of having germ weapons appear more feasible.
The possibility of producing designer pathogens able to spread more expeditiously, to infect greater numbers, to resist treatment and in the process create improved targeting and containment features might conceivably attract those searching for innocuous-seeming, yet deadly biological weaponry. As a possible wave of the future they would represent the basest form of conflict imposed by those seeking an upper hand with no distinction between combatants and civilians.
According to Bruce Bennett, defense researcher at the RAND Corporation research organization, defectors from North Korea have spoken of witnessing testing of biological agents on political prisoners. Amplyfi, a strategic intelligence firm three years ago detected a dramatic increase in North Korean web searches for "antibiotic resistance", "microbial dark matter", "cas protein", and similar terms, leading to the belief in the North's search for advanced gene and germ research contacts.
In June of 2015 following Kim Jong-Un's pose alongside military officers and scientists in a modern-appearing pesticide facility called the BioTechnic Institute, western concerns were alerted. Allegedly producing industrial pesticides, the photos of the plant showed enormous fermenters for growing microbes, as well as spray dryers capable of turning bacterial spores into a fine powder that could be inhaled.
The site's threatening potential was first identified by Melissa Hanham who felt that evidence suggests the North has succeeded in building an agricultural plant capable of repurposing within weeks, to the production of dried anthrax spores. U.S. forces stationed on the Korean Peninsula have been vaccinated against smallpox and anthrax since 2004.
Labels: Biological Waarfare, North Korea, Threats
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