Canada's Security Intelligence Agencies vs Canada's Activist Courts
"What I'm kind of starting to notice is that ... whether it's explicit or not, they can be politically motivated. There might be a trend here. It may be too early to tell, but that's ... something that I've noticed and something that I've heard.""Our client was fortunate enough that he had the resources and the means to hire a lawyer to assist him [in] this process, but if you weren't so fortunate, I mean, he might be facing a lifetime ban."Athena Portokalidis, immigration lawyer, Markham, Ontario"It is next to impossible to challenge the advice that security intelligence agents offer to the department.""It's really about how we interpret what constitutes a risk, and what sort of association actually renders someone inadmissible.""[Many people are screened out based on secret evidence that can't be reviewed, which] often leads to egregious injustices.""What I would say is that in the immigration domain, it is pretty much a Wild West."Sharry Aiken, professor of law, Queen's University
A recent Federal Court decision suggests the Canada Border Services Agency relied on unreliable intelligence when it chose to deny permanent residency to Liping Geng. (Darryl Dyck/The Canadian Press) |
In
Canada, a controversial discussion continues to rage around foreign
interference, efforts by foreign entities in service to their
governments to disrupt Canadian elections. At the same time two arms of
the federal government routinely deport people suspected of engaging in
espionage or terrorism. Or, they are barred from entry to Canada.
Lawyers working within the immigration system anticipate a ramping up of
these efforts by security officials, as a reflection of the heightened
attention on the internal meddling by other countries in strictly
Canadian affairs.
But
then, it is not the work of immigration lawyers to be aware of
potential disruptions allied with the entry to Canada of foreign
elements tasked with infiltrating Canadian academia, society,
corporations and governments at all levels; their bread-and-butter is
successful representation of the clients in whose service their
professional credentials earn them both reputation and financial
security. Their very business model is based on representing clients,
not the security and welfare of Canada.
In
the security screening process which determines who may enter Canada
and which visa applicants may not, the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service, Canada Border Services Agency and the Immigration Department
are all involved. Officials are tasked with barring permanent residents
or foreign nationals from entry to Canada through the Immigratuon and
Refugee Protection Act, should they be engaged in terrorism or in
espionage injurious to Canada's interests.
The
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada acts as the independent
administrative tribunal hearing applications. Should there be red flags
when people submit applications for visas, they become subject to
background and security checks; CSIS and CBSA produce reports to the
board, and how to manage an application then is up to the discretion of
the Immigration and Refugee Board. Those applicants deemed inadmissible
through this process have the right to appeal to the Federal Court.
A
former Canadian citizen who had been denied permanent residence, deemed
inadmissible on the basis that he taught English to Chinese spies and
might be involved in espionage himself, was represented by immigration
lawyer Athena Portokalidis. Liping Geng, a 68-year-old Chinese citizen's
case was set out in a report prepared by the National Security Screen
Division of CBSA, citing information from a CSIS report.
Double-screening, in other words by two separate, but cooperative
intelligence agencies.
According
to court records, Geng was a member of China's People's Liberation Army
as a young man. He worked as an English teacher after completing
school, at an army-operated department training students in foreign
languages. Everyone who attended the school was "in or was linked to Chinese military intelligence",
Canadian officials stated; the teachers were actively engaged in
espionage. Later, Geng spent nine years completing master's and doctoral
degrees at University of Toronto.
From
there he went on to teach, and his family was approved for permanent
residence status in Canada, becoming citizens in 1995. Geng returned to
China in 2007, choosing to renounce his Canadian citizenship, since
China will not recognize dual citizenship. He continued to regularly
visit his family in Canada in following years, then chose to return
permanently to Canada after retirement, in 2019.
Security
officials were criticized for taking their evidence from newspapers and
other open sources to build their case to exclude the man, instead of
acquiring hard evidence, leading Federal Court Justice Richard Mosley on
appeal to find that CSIS and CBSA reports accusing Geng of espionage "drove the decision-making process".
The justice then wrote a ruling that quashed the Immigration and
Refugee Board's decision; that the security assessments amounted to an "overzealous effort" to establish Geng as a member of the Chinese military.
Federal Court Justice Richard Mosley found the the consequences of the decision to deny Liping Geng admission were 'particularly harsh.' (Sean Kilpatrick/Canadian Press) |
But
failing to take into account that China enacted a law calling on all
its expatriate citizens wherever in the world they live, to be loyal to
China and follow the Chinese Communist Party rules of engagement.
Espionage, both commercial/scientific and military/government, along
with academic, is a Chinese strategy long recognized to have robbed
Western countries of trade and military secrets. Moreover, Chinese law
empowers Beijing to hold Chinese who are citizens of other countries
liable to China for maligning the CCP, or refusing to act on Beijing's
behest.
"[A CBSA security assessment in April 2021 cited the CSIS report and other documents found on the internet to conclude that the language school falls within the organizational structure of the Chinese signals spy agency] and that many graduates are assigned to 3/PLA monitoring and control stations, including those targeting the United States and Canada.""As a result of his employment as a lecturer with the LFLI, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant is a member of an organization, the 3/PLA, that has engaged in acts of espionage that are against Canada and contrary to Canada's interests.""There are also reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant himself has engaged in espionage."CBSA report"[The language institute where Geng taught] is a military training institute where officers and foreign affairs officials receive language training, including for the purpose of being assigned to listening posts."CSIS report
Labels: Activist Courts in Canada, CBSA, CSIS, Denying Entrance to Canada, Espionage, Screening Visa Applicants
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