China's Political Subversion Agenda : A Real and Present Danger

"Secret [for] Canadian Eyes Only." 

"Triads [covers the activities of Chinese organized crime groups including within Canada]."

"Intelligence Services of the People's Republic of China [details the methodology of Beijing's agents and their infiltration activities in Canada; and] The PRCIS and the Triads [analyzes the connection between the People's Republic of China's Intelligence Service and organized crime]."

RCMP/CSIS Joint investigation report

An early draft of this report had been leaked before now but was controversially discredited by Canada’s Security Intelligence Review Committee. Photo by Government of Canada

Evidence was found by Canada's domestic spy agency CSIS (Canadian Security Intelligence Service) and its federal police force, the RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police), and spelled out in detail in a secret report both agencies contributed to, of foreign agents infiltrating Canada to "influence ... important leaders" and "neutralize" any criticism of China. This is a report, recently surrendered for public scrutiny after many redactions, that had been composed a quarter-century ago. 

The report had been finalized in 1998 and is now partially declassified; a report resulting from a joint RCMP-CSIS investigation called 'Project Sidewinder' that set out to examine links between the Chinese government intelligence agencies and Chinese organized crime groups. While an early draft of the report had been leaked at one time it had been discredited by Canada's Security Intelligence Review Committee.

"They [Chinese agents] attempt to secure access to, influence with, and the support of important leaders, officials and sectors of the population, particularly with the Chinese communities."

"The PRCIS also seeks to mute criticism of the Chinese government in Canada and to identify and neutralize political forces in Canada opposed to Beijing's policies."

"Canada is seen as an excellent source of indigenous and foreign advanced technology both open and restricted [ie. proprietary, classified or embargoed], with which to expedite the modernization of China's economy."

RCMP/CSIS Joint investigation report

The report, entitled "Allegations of Co-operation Between the Triads and the Government of the People's Republic of China", describes concerns relating to Chinese political interference in Canada, concerns that have re-emerged recently through intelligence leaks alerting the public. Accusations that the current Liberal government of Justin Trudeau continued to ignore such warnings in its zeal to sign a free trade agreement with China, led finally to the launch of a public inquiry as a result of pressure exerted on the government by parliamentary opposition critics.

In the late 1990s, relations between Canada and the Chinese government were warm. Here, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is seen with China's Xi Jinping during a G20 summit in Bali last year. (Sean Kilpatrick/The Canadian Press)

The report is 26 detailed pages in length, incorporating three main sections. Issues of concern were possible cooperation between Chinese criminal groups and the Chinese government; Chinese political interference in Canada; and China's intelligence services activities. The final conclusion reached by the report was that Chinese intelligence services actively attempted to recruit business and political leaders in Canada to influence Canada's political activities dating from the 1990s. 

"PRCIS front companies and Canadian companies have been used to slip PRCIS [People's Republic of China Intelligence Services] personnel into Canada in delegations."

"The thousands of Chinese students and delegates who come to Canada each year and are hampered by few restrictions in moving about the country, pose the greatest Chinese intelligence threat."

RCMP/CSIS Joint investigation report

There was also the highlighted issue of China's intelligence services actively seeking Canadian intellectual property to be handed over to Chinese organizations. Noted in the report as well was China's use of "mass line" intelligence gathering with the use of a network of informed Chinese nationals tasked to travel abroad for the express purpose of gathering useful intelligence information.

Old intelligence reports accused Beijing of using criminal triads to do their dirty work outside mainland China. In one recent example, criminal groups are suspected of beating pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong, seen here in 2019. (Ming Ko/AP)

Former national security analyst Stephanie Carvin commented on China's pursuit of a similar agenda in 1999, similar to what it is pursuing at present, irrespective of different leaders of the Chinese Communist Government in the last 25 years. When the report was submitted to government 25 years ago, then-Liberal prime minister Jean Chretien dismissed allegations of political interference. It would, if given credence, interfere with his personal plans to do business in China which his series of trade missions had set the groundwork for.

In addition, the Project Sidewinder report confirmed that Chinese criminal organizations were actively working in Canada. "this country is an excellent place for them to invest in companies, launder profits derived from criminal activities, secure a portion of their assets outside Hong Kong and obtain a Canadian passport".

Media reports earlier in 2023 informed by intelligence source leaks speak of widespread efforts by the Chinese government to interfere in recent 2019 and 2021 elections in Canada. Underhanded work such as misleading social media to reflect a Chinese agenda, and WeChat posts in Chinese aimed at influencing Canada's huge Chinese diaspora communities, in a deliberate mission to have the Liberals returned to government while demonizing their opposition Conservatives. 

Former Conservative MP Kenny Chiu says he was targeted for attacks by the Chinese government in the 2021 election after he proposed creating a registry of foreign agents, like some other countries have. (Adrian Wyld/The Canadian Press)

"I would say what's different now is scale."

"The other thing that's really coming in since 1999, I would say is the cyber angle [China's online disinformation and computerized intelligence-gathering]."

"I don't think this was ever forgotten [keeping an intelligence services eye on China in the 1990s of subversive activities]."

"I'm just not sure the extent people were paying attention until recently."

Stephanie Carvin, associate professor, Carleton University, former national security analyst

A Chinese man cycles past a billboard in front of Beijing's Forbidden City before a 2001 visit by then-Canadian prime minister Jean Chretien. At the time, concerned U.S. officials were secretly probing Chinese operations in Canada. (Reuters)

Canada's Security Intelligence Agencies vs Canada's Activist Courts

"What I'm kind of starting to notice is that ... whether it's explicit or not, they can be politically motivated. There might be a trend here. It may be too early to tell, but that's ... something that I've noticed and something that I've heard."

"Our client was fortunate enough that he had the resources and the means to hire a lawyer to assist him [in] this process, but if you weren't so fortunate, I mean, he might be facing a lifetime ban."

Athena Portokalidis, immigration lawyer, Markham, Ontario

 

"It is next to impossible to challenge the advice that security intelligence agents offer to the department."

"It's really about how we interpret what constitutes a risk, and what sort of association actually renders someone inadmissible."

"[Many people are screened out based on secret evidence that can't be reviewed, which] often leads to egregious injustices."

"What I would say is that in the immigration domain, it is pretty much a Wild West."

Sharry Aiken, professor of law, Queen's University

A recent Federal Court decision suggests the Canada Border Services Agency relied on unreliable intelligence when it chose to deny permanent residency to Liping Geng. (Darryl Dyck/The Canadian Press)

In Canada, a controversial discussion continues to rage around foreign interference, efforts by foreign entities in service to their governments to disrupt Canadian elections. At the same time two arms of the federal government routinely deport people suspected of engaging in espionage or terrorism. Or, they are barred from entry to Canada. Lawyers working within the immigration system anticipate a ramping up of these efforts by security officials, as a reflection of the heightened attention on the internal meddling by other countries in strictly Canadian affairs. 

But then, it is not the work of immigration lawyers to be aware of potential disruptions allied with the entry to Canada of foreign elements tasked with infiltrating Canadian academia, society, corporations and governments at all levels; their bread-and-butter is successful representation of the clients in whose service their professional credentials earn them both reputation and financial security. Their very business model is based on representing clients, not the security and welfare of Canada.

In the security screening process which determines who may enter Canada and which visa applicants may not, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Canada Border Services Agency and the Immigration Department are all involved. Officials are tasked with barring permanent residents or foreign nationals from entry to Canada through the Immigratuon and Refugee Protection Act, should they be engaged in terrorism or in espionage injurious to Canada's interests.

The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada acts as the independent administrative tribunal hearing applications. Should there be red flags when people submit applications for visas, they become subject to background and security checks; CSIS and CBSA produce reports to the board, and how to manage an application then is up to the discretion of the Immigration and Refugee Board. Those applicants deemed inadmissible through this process have the right to appeal to the Federal Court.

A former Canadian citizen who had been denied permanent residence, deemed inadmissible on the basis that he taught English to Chinese spies and might be involved in espionage himself, was represented by immigration lawyer Athena Portokalidis. Liping Geng, a 68-year-old Chinese citizen's case was set out in a report prepared by the National Security Screen Division of CBSA, citing information from a CSIS report. Double-screening, in other words by two separate, but cooperative intelligence agencies.

According to court records, Geng was a member of China's People's Liberation Army as a young man. He worked as an English teacher after completing school, at an army-operated department training students in foreign languages. Everyone who attended the school was "in or was linked to Chinese military intelligence", Canadian officials stated; the teachers were actively engaged in espionage. Later, Geng spent nine years completing master's and doctoral degrees at University of Toronto.

From there he went on to teach, and his family was approved for permanent residence status in Canada, becoming citizens in 1995. Geng returned to China in 2007, choosing to renounce his Canadian citizenship, since China will not recognize dual citizenship. He continued to regularly visit his family in Canada in following years, then chose to return permanently to Canada after retirement, in 2019.

Security officials were criticized for taking their evidence from newspapers and other open sources to build their case to exclude the man, instead of acquiring hard evidence, leading Federal Court Justice Richard Mosley on appeal to find that CSIS and CBSA reports accusing Geng of espionage "drove the decision-making process". The justice then wrote a ruling that quashed the Immigration and Refugee Board's decision; that the security assessments amounted to an "overzealous effort" to establish Geng as a member of the Chinese military.

Federal Court Justice Richard Mosley found the the consequences of the decision to deny Liping Geng admission were 'particularly harsh.' (Sean Kilpatrick/Canadian Press)

 

But failing to take into account that China enacted a law calling on all its expatriate citizens wherever in the world they live, to be loyal to China and follow the Chinese Communist Party rules of engagement. Espionage, both commercial/scientific and military/government, along with academic, is a Chinese strategy long recognized to have robbed Western countries of trade and military secrets. Moreover, Chinese law empowers Beijing to hold Chinese who are citizens of other countries liable to China for maligning the CCP, or refusing to act on Beijing's behest.

"[A CBSA security assessment in April 2021 cited the CSIS report and other documents found on the internet to conclude that the language school falls within the organizational structure of the Chinese signals spy agency] and that many graduates are assigned to 3/PLA monitoring and control stations, including those targeting the United States and Canada."

"As a result of his employment as a lecturer with the LFLI, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant is a member of an organization, the 3/PLA, that has engaged in acts of espionage that are against Canada and contrary to Canada's interests."

"There are also reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant himself has engaged in espionage."

CBSA report

 

"[The language institute where Geng taught] is a military training institute where officers and foreign affairs officials receive language training, including for the purpose of being assigned to listening posts."

CSIS report

People walk across a street near a large screen promoting the Chinese People's Liberation Army in Beijing.  Andy Wong/The Associated Press