Op-Ed: Europe's Hizbullah Problem
Published: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 2:31 PM - Arutz Sheva 7
While fear of reprisal is both psychologically understandable and perhaps even morally defensible, turning the other cheek will not deter and has never deterred this terrorist organization.
Mark Silverberg, Ariel U. Policy Research Center
Mark Silverberg is a foreign policy analyst for the Ariel Center for Policy Research (Israel), a Contributing Editor for Family Security Matters, Intellectual Conservative and the New Media Journal and a member of Hadassah’s National Academic Advisory Board. His book “The Quartermasters of Terror: Saudi Arabia and the Global Islamic Jihad” and his articles have been archived under www. marksilverberg .com and www. analyst-network .com.
Hizbullah’s
involvement in the Burgas tragedy should make European leaders rethink
the standard excuses they have made to rationalize their lack of action
against Hizbullah. One often-quoted EU excuse maintains that since
Hizbullah in Lebanon has both a military aspect and a political/social
aspect, clamping down on the former would cripple the latter and
destabilize the Hizbullah-dominated government of the country.
Since when did Hizbullah become a charitable organization like Oxfam or the Red Cross? As the Chicago Tribune
pointed out recently: “Hizbullah's idea of investing in the next
generation is to acquire 50,000 missiles - more than many NATO members
possess - and stockpile them in the immediate vicinity of schools and
playgrounds. It doesn't take a Nobel Peace Prize laureate to realize
that this isn't exactly a selfless humanitarian organization.”
While
this hair splitting gives Hizbullah the wiggle room it needs to carry
on its nefarious activities in Europe, the argument has no validity
given that the EU’s terror list
already includes Hamas, which won the Palestinian legislative elections
in 2006, as well as the Communist Party of the Philippines, the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and other radical organizations that are
involved in their countries’ political systems.
And
given that the EU has already sanctioned individuals and entities
“responsible for the violent repression against the civilian population
in Syria", there is no logical reason to exclude Hizbullah as it clearly
falls into this category given its continuing support of the Assad
regime.
This argument is
especially specious given that Hizbullah’s second-in-command Naim Qassem
has already rejected the British separation of his organization into
political and military wings. Qassem told the Los Angeles Times in 2009: “The same leadership that directs the parliamentary and government work (in Lebanon) also leads jihad actions in the struggle against Israel.”
Stripping
away all this double-speak, EU member states, most notably France and
Germany, fear that proscribing Hizbullah as a terrorist organization
could potentially lead to the activation of its terror cells across the
continent. According to Matthew Levitt, the Director of the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy’s counterterrorism and intelligence
program, the Europeans are afraid to stir up a hornet’s nest.
“Hizbullah” he writes, “is not very active in Europe and the Europeans
feel that if you poke Hizbullah or Iran in the eye, they will do the
same to you. If you leave them alone, then maybe they will leave you
alone.”
France is particularly
apprehensive given the exposure of its UNIFIL forces in Lebanon to
Hizbullah fire, and it is even more concerned that designating it as a
terrorist organization would, once again, bring
Hizbullah/Iranian-directed terrorism back to its streets.
Their
fear is not entirely unjustified. Since its inception by Tehran in
1982, the organization has been committed to the anti-Semitic,
anti-Western goals set out by Ayatollah Khomeini for the global
expansion of Shia Islam.
Even
former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage considered
Hizbullah the “A-Team of terrorism”. Prior to 9/11, it had murdered more
Americans than any other terrorist group and it has attempted and/or
perpetrated terror attacks on its own and in conjunction with its
Iranian benefactors in Argentina, Britain, India, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Greece, Kenya, Cyprus, Israel, Thailand, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and
Lebanon, in addition to its illegal albeit lucrative activities in Latin
America and West Africa.
In the
Middle East, it has acted as a proxy for the Syrian and Iranian regimes,
receiving money and weapons from both in return for “services rendered”
including its complicity in the assassination of the anti-Syrian former
Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri, in 2005.
In Europe, however, Hizbullah has maintained a relatively low profile
since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, quietly holding meetings and
raising money that goes directly to Lebanon not only for building
schools and clinics, and delivering social services, but for financing its global terrorist activities on behalf of its Iranian masters. In January 2010, Der Spiegel noted that Hizbullah was “using drug trafficking in Europe to fund part of its activities.”
In one case, the German police arrested
two Lebanese citizens after they transferred “large sums of money to a
family in Lebanon with connections to Hizbullah's leadership.” German
authorities also found 8.7 million Euros in the bags of four other
Lebanese men at the Frankfurt airport in 2008.
According
to intelligence officials, Hizbullah operatives, using Europe as a base
for money-laundering and fundraising, are deployed throughout Belgium,
Bosnia, Britain, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine with an estimated 950 members
in Germany alone according to a 2011 report issued by the Federal Office
for the Protection of the Constitution.
While European security services
maintain surveillance on Hizbullah’s political supporters, experts say
they are ineffective when it comes to tracking Hizbullah sleeper cells
that pose the greatest danger. According to Alexander Ritzmann, a policy
adviser at the European Foundation for Democracy in Brussels, who
testified before Congress on Hizbullah: “They have real, trained
operatives in Europe that have not been used in a long time, but if they
wanted them to become active, they could.” And therein lies the EU
dilemma.
In the final analysis,
however, while fear of reprisal is both psychologically understandable
and perhaps even morally defensible, turning
the other cheek will not deter and has never deterred this terrorist
organization. The EU’s anti-terror policy cannot be based on the false
hope that Hizbullah will try to avoid killing European bystanders at
home and abroad as it carries out its terrorist attacks. Without a
strong reaction to the Burgas attack, Hizbullah will understand that it
can attack any group with impunity so long as it is feared.
It
has already done so. In 2007, James Phillips, writing for The Heritage
Foundation, noted that Hizbullah terrorist attacks against Europeans
began decades ago and could easily begin again: “The October 1983
bombing of the French contingent of the multinational peacekeeping force
in Lebanon (on the same day as the U.S. Marine barracks bombing), which
killed 58 French soldiers; the December 1983 bombing of the French
Embassy in Kuwait; the April 1985 bombing of a restaurant near a U.S.
base in Madrid, Spain which killed 18 Spanish citizens; a campaign of 13
bombings in France in 1986 that targeted shopping centers and railroad
facilities, killing 13 people and wounding more than 250; and a March
1989 attempt to assassinate British novelist Salman Rushdie that failed
when a bomb exploded prematurely killing a terrorist in London.”
On
the other hand, freezing Hizbullah assets in Europe and imposing EU
sanctions would deprive the organization of its European funding sources
and operational freedom. It would enable the freezing of European bank
accounts and facilitate cross-border cooperation in apprehending and
arresting Hezbollah operatives in Europe.
Weakening
Hizbullah, which is already terrified by the prospect of losing its
Syrian ally, would advance the EU's policy goals in the Middle East. It
would be a blow to Assad's regime and increase the chances of
re-establishing a truly democratic Lebanon free of Hizbullah's political
and military stranglehold, not to mention a strategic victory over Iran
and its plan for Shiite hegemony in the Middle East.
Alternatively,
the failure to list Hezbollah as a terrorist organization will provide
it with the opportunity to further organize, recruit, raise funds, and
carry out additional terrorist attacks across the European continent and
throughout the world.
At this
point, it should be clear to the Europeans, based upon their past
experience, that terrorism cannot be appeased, nor can organizations
that perpetrate it be defeated unless and until their supporting
infrastructures have been shut down especially their political and
financial front organizations.
Europe's
anti-terrorism policy should not be based on the false hope that, if
left alone, Hizbullah will better calibrate its future terror attacks to
avoid hurting European bystanders. This attitude is no different from
that expressed by Winston Churchill when he said: “An appeaser is one
who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.” This crocodile has
already consumed half of Lebanon and has sown seeds of destruction
around the world. Contrary to their prevailing attitude, the Europeans
will not be the last to be eaten. They will be among Hizbullah's first
victims.
So long as Europe
remains blind to this reality and allows Hizbullah to conduct business
as usual throughout Europe, it is guilty not just of hypocrisy, but of
passive complicity in Hizbullah's attacks on innocent civilians.
Inaction on the part of the EU will transform Europe into a free-fire
zone and Europeans will not be exempt from the slaughters that will
ensue regardless of how long they continue to bury their heads in the
sand.
Labels: Atrocities, Conflict, Crisis Politics, European Union, France, Hezbollah, Islamism, Lebanon, Terrorism
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