But this is 2013, and Obama and Netanyahu have built a certain kind of trust. The Israeli premier was careful on Sept. 30 to show reverence toward the American president, emphasizing their points of agreement while elegantly glossing over the moot issues. He was careful not to be a wet blanket on Obama’s party, especially with fallout over the US federal budget expected the next day, an issue of much greater interest to the American president and public than the centrifuges in Natanz. 

That being the case, Netanyahu still planned to relish the opportunity to ruin the world’s party during his address to the UN General Assembly on Oct. 1. This article was written before the speech, and the information provided here is based on discussions, assessments and positions voiced in the backrooms of the offices of the prime minister and members of the top echelon of Israeli politics prior to Netanyahu's departure for the United States.

My assumption is that some of these things came up during the tête-à-tête between Netanyahu and Obama while some did not. Even the terminology used by defense chiefs and senior ministers at meetings with Netanyahu radically changes when the prime minister steps into the Oval Office. Presumably, the atmosphere at the meeting between the two leaders was most probably less relaxed than what they displayed at their joint press conference.

From Netanyahu’s standpoint, his entire worldview, his life’s calling and vocation were weighing heavily on his shoulders when he faced the president who seeks to embark on negotiations with Iran, which is on the cusp of acquiring a nuclear military capability. Netanyahu has no room for maneuver or mistakes. All he has is Obama.

What emerges from talks with his associates is that Netanyahu feels that he is bearing the heavy burden of the Jewish people’s history on his shoulders when he is sitting there, trying to convince the president that the Iranians are planning to deceive him, fritter away time, “talk and enrich” until they find the right time to announce a fait accompli, a done deal — Iran is nuclear and henceforth untouchable.

In the backrooms in Jerusalem, allegations are leveled at America’s “lack of leadership,” vacillation, zigzagging and weakness. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, Israelis are saying, is coming to these negotiations on all fours, but it is the Americans who are actually crawling, wooing him, offering “water-cooler meetings.” They dance to the Persian flute, whose sole purpose is to fool the West and loosen the tight economic noose around Iran’s neck, even at the price of somewhat delaying their progress toward acquiring a nuclear military capability.  

Iran’s President Rouhani, Israelis are saying, is the “master of deception,” having himself coined the phrase “talking and enriching” and having written a book on his tenure as the head of the Iranian nuclear negotiation team. His smile conceals cunning, determination and perseverance. We must not be led on. We must not let up. We need to take advantage of the momentum. This is the moment of truth. If the Iranians understand that there is no intention to cut them any slack at this juncture, it is possible that this watershed will take place. But if they pick up signs of weaknesses, fatigue and a desire to tick a box and move on, they will exploit this situation to the fullest extent, as world champions at noticing this kind of situation.

Israel will be prepared to buy into a copy of the Syrian model. Netanyahu was supposed to say that to Obama. Here, Syria has pledged to fully dismantle its weapons of mass destruction. It agreed to do so only because there was a real, credible military option on the table. Only when the American destroyers started converging on Syria’s shores and the aircraft carriers moved at full steam toward the country did the Syrians, as well as the Russians, understand that it was time to let go. Just as the Americans did not agree to let the Syrians put up cameras in front of the chemical weapons depots, but demanded (and were given) a commitment to have the weaponry fully removed, dismantled and destroyed, a similar insistence should be made in the Iranian case. Iran should not be allowed to enrich uranium on its soil.

Notwithstanding, Netanyahu had something new to say at the Oval Office. He talked about Iran’s “nuclear military program.” This might suggest that Israel is prepared to consider the American position as outlined in Obama’s UN speech, namely allowing Iran to keep nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Does that include the enrichment of a limited quantity of uranium at a low grade? This remains unclear.

The key question remains what will happen once the talks between Iran and the five large nuclear powers—the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom and France — resume in the middle of October. Israel suspects that Iran will make a few gestures, expecting more lenient sanctions in return. This must not be allowed to happen. The easing of sanctions should occur only when truly concrete measures are implemented, ones that can be verified, supervised and guaranteed. 

Jerusalem knows that the Iranians are the most skilled people in the world at sniffing out and sizing up the perplexed client in front of them at the bazaar. They will exploit any moment of weakness, using every trick in the book to stall while trying to rescue their crumbling economy without giving up true assets. In the wake of the American zigzag in the Syrian case, Tehran is not really deterred and does not really buy into the military option facing it. The Israeli one has eroded while the American one has been proven to be empty. As noted, however, Netanyahu would buy, with open arms, the Syrian model provided that the end result is that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is disarmed of his chemical weapons.

As of Sept. 30, the model appears to be successful. By some Israeli accounts, the initial list of the chemical weapons arsenal that the Syrians submitted to the West seems to be more or less authentic. This is the less important list. Over the coming few days, the Syrians were to submit a more detailed list. This is where they will be put to the real test.

At this stage, these indications suggest that Assad has come to the realization that his chemical weapons pose a threat to his life and his regime and not the other way round. He has come to terms with the fact that in the overall cost-benefit analysis, he has lost this tool. The reports about his attempts to transfer some of the weapons to Hezbollah are incorrect.

It is possible that Assad will try to keep some small quantities for himself, but even Hezbollah has realized that it neither needs nor is it interested in the chemical weapons. At this stage, the Russian-brokered agreement is a rare diplomatic success, which was accomplished by chance, following a demonstration of soft power and zigzagging by the American administration.

Israel hopes that Obama will not arrive at the wrong conclusion from what had transpired here. To solve the Iranian problem, Jerusalem says, he will need to demonstrate much greater resolve, creativity and a much larger stick than the one he flashed at Syria.

Ben Caspit is a contributing writer for Al-Monitor's Israel Pulse. He is also a senior columnist and political analyst for Israeli newspapers, and has a daily radio show and regular TV shows on politics and Israel. On Twitter: @BenCaspit