generalspeaking

"On the nuclear issue, the United States and European colonialist countries gathered and applied their entire efforts to bring the Islamic Republic to its knees but they could not and they will not." Ayatollah Ali Khamenei

"[Iran] has achieved a significant victory. Negotiations will lead to a deal, sooner or later. [Many obstacles in the talks] have been eliminated."
Iranian President Hassan Rohani

R-40 Reactor. Heavy Water Production Plant near Arak

'Obstacles', needless to say, representing the obstinacy of the West in declaring their imposed ideas on what should be permitted the Islamic Republic of Iran in pursuing its nuclear goals. From heavy water production facilities to the number of centrifuges spinning enriched uranium, to the regular inspections at Fordow and Arak by IAEA inspectors, all representing the impudence of Iran's competitors in the global arena, jealous of the Republic's successes.

But the negotiations failed to conclude with a mutual agreement on the 24th of November, and agreement for an extension of seven months for further negotiations were agreed upon. An annoyance to Iran, but a bit of a success as well, since Iran so excels at persuading its interfering Western interlocutors that agreement can be reached, if they all try a little harder to match Iran's agreeableness to those negotiations. The process buying time for Iran.

So how well has the G5+1 succeeded in turning Iran toward its reassurance demands that it prove it has no intention of fashioning a nuclear arsenal, despite its sincere attestations that it interested only in civil nuclear production? Both sides reached agreement that Iran should possess an "enrichment program with practical limits and transparency measure", though Iran's perception on the matter does not quite match that of the G5+1.

Uranium can be enriched, the G5+1 holds, from a low, reactor-fuel level up to grades used to enable the core of a nuclear weapon. Iran balks from pulling away from expanding enrichment to that level that requires 190.000 centrifuges, claiming it is prepared to reduce its currently operating 20,000 to 7,000. Washington originally insisted on no more than 2,000, and now has moved closer to Iran's figure, accepting 4,000.

The U.S. and allies want the underground enrichment plant near Fordow closed or converted to another use, while Iran insists it must maintain the centrifuges in operation there even if they aren't actually enriching uranium (?). The Arak heavy-water unit under construction capable of producing amounts of plutonium useful as the fissile core of a missile is an issue the U.S. feels requires another reactor type entirely to produce minuscule plutonium.
Heavy water is used to moderate the nuclear fission chain reaction either in a certain type of reactor - albeit not the type that Iran is currently building - or produce plutonium for use in a nuclear bomb.

If Iran is proven to honour the final agreement it would have the right in 20 years' time to expand enrichment without strict monitoring. Iran would prefer less than ten years, rather than restrictions imposed over a two-decade period. And immediate and permanent relief from U.S., E.U., and U.N. sanctions should accompany Iran's agreeable cooperation. Cooperation that the IAEA states is non-existent, unfortunately.

As for relief from crippling economic sanctions, perhaps Iran should have been a tad more agreeable before the Republican-majority Congress begins their work in January, including their threat to ramp up sanctions should an agreement not dismantle the enrichment process. The latest effort by the UN atomic agency to investigate allegations of work on nuclear weapons has been foiled by an uncooperative Iran.

Information sought by the International Atomic Energy Agency was withheld by Tehran. The IAEA investigation is separate from the ongoing negotiations, but obviously linked to them if for no other very vital reason that what emanates from them represents what can be expected from Iran and the Ayatollah Khamenei's final decision-making.

A deal can be struck only at such time as the IAEA can be satisfied with the final results of its probe.

And then Israel can start fretting existentially again in serious over the good-natured musing of the Grand Ayatollah.