Thursday, June 11, 2015

That's The Debate

"These new advisers will work to build capacity of Iraqi forces, including local tribal fighters, to improve their ability to plan, lead and conduct operations against ISIL in eastern Anbar under the command of the prime minister."
Josh Earnest, White House spokesman

"U.S. support can help the Iraqi government, but no amount of support can make them win."
"Winning requires the Iraqi government itself to motivate its soldiers and reassure those whom those soldiers seek to protect."
Jon Alterman, Center for Strategic and International Studies
















A fifth training site is to be opened in Iraq. The Obama administration visualizes an additional 450 American troops in a strictly training capacity with no combat duties whatsoever, having the desired effect of convincing Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and his administration that victory over Islamic State is entirely feasible and possible, but only if and when the Iraqi Security Forces are integrated with Iraqi Sunni fighters in a combined strike force against the Islamist terrorists

Which is wishful thinking at its most hopefully fanciful. Given the verifiable facts on the ground that although the Iraqi military has been routed time and again by the more robustly barbarian vicious drive of Islamic State guerrillas, the government in Iraq still has not seen fit to welcome and arm their Sunni citizens to join ranks with the country's Shia-led military. Perhaps it is due to the absurdity that such futility even exists that the United States cannot recognize it for the death-wish that it represents.

The suspicion and hatred that exists throughout the Muslim world between Shiite and Sunni branches of Islam, and particularly in the Middle East is so vividly emblematic of sectarian dysfunction as to lead to the carnage of bloodbaths representing a schism almost as old as Islam itself. Reason and the exigencies of self-preservation do not appear capable of impinging on the sensibilities of a disaffection as unreasonable as it is brutally expressed.

The American strategy remains unchanged in essence; no combat role for American troops; advisory only. And under most circumstances, in most countries of the world where governments face the potential of defeat at the hands of an implacable enemy, as well armed as it is, but more devastatingly motivated by the deep investment it has in religious certainty that it acts for the spirit of Allah, and the sacred Koran itself exhorts to the kind of martyrdom sacrifice it exacts from its fighters in forwarding the cause, it seems unbeatable.

Islamic State's skills in public relations, in presenting itself as fearless and determined beyond anything that would deter others to its ways and means of conquest through dread deeds of incomprehensible cruelty has created a formidable legend of power and unconquerability, enough so to chill the blood of those invested by their state to the defence of the country. So, though Shiite Iraq dreads and fears Islamic State -- and with good enough reason -- it is not prepared to enlist its Sunni citizens in an equally-endowed push to defeat the ferocious Islamists.

The Iraqi government's suspicion of its own Sunni tribes and its Kurdish population, though the Peshmerga has proven itself capable as the Iraqi army has not, and the Sunni tribes have in the past demonstrated their ability to push back Sunni terrorists, speaks of its own submission to paranoia making defeat entirely possible. It will not adequately arm either its Sunni citizens or its Kurdish allies to give them the offensive requirements to defend the country against further ISIL encroachments.

And yet the Obama administration insists on providing training and weaponry only through the Iraqi government, which it depends upon to supply the Kurds and the Sunnis but which the government has demonstrated time and again it will not do sufficiently to make the difference required. The U.S. cannot conceive of a country like Iraq working against its own interests in survival by excluding much of its population in defence. It focuses in the anaemic assistance that training alone should provide, but if the will is not present, training alone will not suffice.

"How much of a combat role are we allowing U.S. troops to face on a day-to-day basis? That's the debate inside the administration", stated Shawn Brimley, familiar enough with the situation through his work at the White House and Pentagon throughout President Obama's first term. Who questions, but knows quite well the answer to his question.

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