"[The documents raise] concerns that the Trump administration has not carefully considered the proliferation risks posed by the proposed nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia or the precedent this agreement may set." 

"[The document contends that reaching a deal with the kingdom] will advance the national security interests of the United States, breaking with the failed policies of inaction and indecision that our competitors have capitalized on to disadvantage American industry and diminish the United States standing globally in this critical sector."

"Nuclear cooperation can be a positive mechanism for upholding nonproliferation norms and increasing transparency, but the devil is in the details."

"This suggests that once the bilateral safeguards agreement is in place, it will open the door for Saudi Arabia to acquire uranium enrichment technology or capabilities — possibly even from the United States."

"Even with restrictions and limits, it seems likely that Saudi Arabia will have a path to some type of uranium enrichment or access to knowledge about enrichment."

"It behooves Congress [to provide a check on the administration's power to strike an agreement with the kingdom and] consider not just the implications for Saudi Arabia, but also the precedent that this deal will set, and vigorously examine the terms of the proposed 123 Agreement." 

Kelsey Davenport, director for non-proliferation policy, Arms Control Association, Washington 

 

"[If Iran obtains the bomb], we will have to get one".

[A weapon would be necessary] for security reasons, and for balancing power in the Middle East, but we don't want to see that." 

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salmon

President Donald Trump (R) shows Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia the "Presidential Walk of Fame" as they walk on the colonnade at the White House on November 18, 2025 in Washington, DC   Getty Images

 

It could be done differently. There is the example of the United Arab Emirates neighbouring Saudi Arabia, which signed a '123 agreement' with the United States. With that agreement by the UAE and the U.S., with South Korean assistance the Barakah nuclear power plant will be built. The United Arab Emirates however, unlike Saudi Arabia, expressed no interest in achieving enrichment as part of its agreement. Instead it chose to opt for nuclear power generation for energy use, signing an agreement considered to be the 'gold standard' for nations seeking atomic power, according to nonproliferation experts. 

 

However, it seems the Trump administration has decided that Saudi Arabia could after all have some form of uranium enrichment under the proposed agreement with the U.S. as suggested by congressional documents. Raising proliferation concerns by arms control groups, in the midst of an atomic standoff between the Islamic Republic of Iran which has always denied its nuclear program would have a military component, now facing off against an American ultimatum to surrender all current and future prospects of nuclear research and production.

Any spinning centrifuges within Saudi Arabia, warn non-proliferation experts, could lead to a potential weapons program for the kingdom. A certain likelihood, given past assertions by Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince whose past statements were emphatic that should Tehran achieve the production of atomic bombs, he would pursue a similar program for Saudi Arabia. As it is, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defence pact last year following Israel's attack on Qatar targeting Hamas officials.

Pakistan's own expertise in producing atomic bombs for its own arsenal could certainly ensure that under that mutual defence pact, a sharing of nuclear know-how could consolidate that pact. At the time of the signing, Pakistan's defence minister said as much when he declared that his country's nuclear program "will be made available" to Saudi Arabia should it be required. A declaration that some view as a threat meant to draw Israel's attention that it will not long remain the Middle East's sole nuclear-armed state.

 

The Trump administration, it seems, is aspiring for 20 nuclear business deals with world nations, one that includes Saudi Arabia, a deal that could be valued in billions for U.S. coffers. Perhaps the administration is that short-sighted it is incapable of looking beyond the wealth it could accrue to itself, to the situation as it appears to the non-proliferation crowd; lighting a match in the gas-saturated environment of the Middle East where conflicts are constant and a conflagration of immense significance could be enabled in an area where tribal and sectarian conflict and bloodshed are business as usual.

 

The United States views with its jaundiced eye competitors such as China, France, Russia and South Korea among those leading nations selling nuclear power plant technology. While the draft deal            would in theory have the U.S. and Saudi Arabia enter safeguard agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to include oversight of the "most proliferation-sensitive areas of potential nuclear co-operation", listing enrichment, fuel fabrication and reprocessing as potential areas of concern, there is the sobering example of years of fruitless negotiation with Tehran. 

 

Workers on a construction site at Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant in November 2019. Atta Kenare/AFP/Getty Images