The Theory, The Reality
Take-charge American General Stanley McChrystal has a full understanding of the difficulties faced by NATO and UN-allied troops in Afghanistan; stemming the insurgency tide and winning the trust of ordinary Afghans. A fully successful counter-insurgency would include measures that are designed to fight a new kind of war to meet any kind of success. The Afghan mission must pair military forces with local Afghanistan communities.Establish a bond, one of trust and commitment with one another. On the human level that sounds reasonable and good. Certainly worth a heap of trying. Of course there is the little inconvenience of national heritage, customs, religion, language and tribal culture at total variance between the entities. On the other hand, human compassion and one-on-one - even unto one group toward another group - communication can accomplish much.
So the theory is to get the military out from behind their protective barricades. Instead of marching out on daily forays, then marching back in behind the barricades for maximum protection, get those troops out, to live within the village setting alongside Afghan citizens. Sharing their space, daytime and nighttime. Teaching them, sharing with them, protecting them. Building confidence.
Getting outside the wire into the remote places where Afghans live. Where they can communicate, gather intelligence, and begin to materially and intellectually assist the people in establishing their systems of local governance, help them to build road, schools, health clinics, communal centres. Sounds very good, very workable.
Build up trust with the locals, so that they will turn their backs on their co-religionists, their tribal brothers in favour of a comfortable alliance with foreigners.
This is considered the realistic choice to afford the collective foreign troops some measure of success in their mission. Which is to defeat the fanatical Islamists, and to aid and assist the country and its current, corrupt and almost-re-elected president to maintain his parliament complete with former tyrants and murderers and drug kings. A parliament that has proven as ineffective as it is corrupt. One that has been incapable of demonstrating leadership.
But then, the NATO and other military forces are engaged in a needful task of adequately training the Afghanistan military and the national police force. To enable them to gain sufficient proficiency in their profession so they may on their own finally be able to protect their country from the terrorist insurgents. To do this also means dealing with endemic corruption, and little-spoken-of sexual violation of young boys, commonly practised.
There are simply no end of complex irritations to be surmounted. Among them the headache of a transnational Taliban, one well established both in Afghanistan, in the border regions between its neighbour, and within Pakistan itself. Of course Pakistan itself is another part of the problem, officially aiding and assisting the battle against the Taliban, but taking care not to greatly upset those Taliban that do not directly threaten Pakistan.
And there's another rub in the prescribed ointment; the 50-or-so nuclear weapons so proudly owned by Pakistan. Which, if it succumbs to the Taliban threat through its faint-hearted response to assaults on its people and its territory, might always fall to the Taliban who might then generously divide the spoils of war with their great good friends, al-Qaeda, for they have so much in common.
Wait: there's more. Canadian troops have long been practising the very theory that the Americans are now espousing. Living among the villagers, holding court with them, discussing mutual matters of interest, helping to build their needed civil infrastructure, training the police and the militia. And that trust and engagement has resulted in - what, exactly?
Canada's commander of the Canadian troops, Brigadier-General Jonathan Vance, threatening elders at one Kandahar village to withhold further assistance so generously given to date, in reflection of a lack of "serious co-operation" on their part. They are beneficiaries of Canadian aid and sincere efforts to bridge the gap of understanding, and yet the take has not resulted in much give.
Giving warning, for example, of IEDs planted on the roadsides where Canadian soldiers drive to their villages - to assist the Canadians in avoiding such dire situations as being bombed, maimed and killed by misadventure. "If we keep blowing up on the roads I'm going to stop doing development", General Vance gently chided a meeting with village elders.
"If we stop doing development in Dand, I believe Afghanistan and Kandahar is a project that cannot be saved." Over to Afghanistans now, to ponder whether the foreign commitment to continue aiding them is worth too many more foreign military lives.
Labels: Canada, Conflict, Human Relations, United States
posted by Pieface @ Wednesday, September 30, 2009
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