"Talking with jihadists and fighting terrorism is not contradictory. I have a duty and a mission today to create all possible
spaces and to do everything possible so that, by one means or another,
some kind of appeasement can be achieved. It's time certain avenues were
explored." "We're going to try and do what the people want, like with the jirga in
Afghanistan, to put it into practice, and we're trying to do it without
being naive, we're not gullible." "We'll continue with our work, with our
duty, but we want to make sure that we will no longer be stubborn about
things, stuck, or obtuse." Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita
"People think that Shariah is more rapid, less corrupt and delivered in a manner that people can understand." "It is also less costly." Drissa Traore, head, Bamako office, International Federation for Human Rights
"The jihadists have gained the hearts and minds of many people." "But what people are asking for are basic social services; they are not asking for jihadist services. They want things like roads and education." "The battle will never be won through military means." Riccardo Maia, MINUSMA head office, Timbuktu
"In all countries in the region you can see economic and social progress in capitals and other cities, but not when you leave the cities." "If you go to more remote areas, nothing has changed for 20 or 30 y6ears. You don't have leaders in the region who seem genuinely to appreciate the stakes." Gilles Yabi, director, Wathi, West African think tank
The Western effort -- mostly through French military intervention followed by diplomacy in a former French colony -- to curtail Islamist insurgencies spreading with alarming rapidity through the Sahel region of Africa, sees the minds of ordinary Malians appear to have accepted the message delivered by jihadists even though they recall the Islamist brutality they reeled under eight years earlier when a jihadist seizure of Timbuktu destroyed heritage sites and irreplaceable ancient documents and slaughtered the unconvinced.
Back then it was forbidden to smoke, for a woman or girl to be seen in the presence of men or boys at risk of flogging. Even so, the jihadists earned a reputation of stern anti-corruption and in their presence there was no crime being committed, given that Shariah actively engaged with the chopping off of hands as a deterrent against theft. "Now there are bandits everywhere", one disgruntled man stated, using a chopping down motion to indicate the effectiveness of Shariah.
The 2013 French-led military force drove the al-Qaeda affiliates from Timbuktu and other Malian towns, but seven years on, jihadists are still about in northern Mali, expanding their reach into other regions the while, despite the presence of 5,000 French troops and a 15,000-strong separate UN peacekeeping force named MINUSMA. The Sahel, a vast region on the southern fringe of the Sahara, now hosts the jihadist insurgency in other states.
Militants have convinced many northern Malians that they should be trusted to represent the people's interests far more than the government in Bamako, the capital of the country. Successive governments in Bamako have neglected the communities in northern Mali for decades. Government is equated with police, soldiers, judges and officials accused with being invested in what they can loot from northern Mali, not in benefiting locals.
Bribery and extortion, and/or involvement in Saharan drugs, weapons and people-smuggling networks cross the region and to the people living there, this is what they think of how the government manifests its interest in their welfare. Even while the jihadists have their hand in drug running as well as smuggling, they have been seen to use their profits to build Koranic schools and Shariah courts to aid in entrenching their extreme ideology, presenting themselves as the legitimate alternatives to the ineffective, disinterested state.
MINUSMA has been heartened by the arrival of 250 British soldiers to aid them in fending off repeated attacks on bases, and mounting dangerous operations to protect civilians. The group has performed whatever it could manage to replace the vacuum left by the state; repairing the road from the Niger to Timbuktu, and in Gao, a former jihadist town, helping to fund women's agricultural collectives, and build police stations, important moves to help win support among the populace.
Mali's president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita is recognized among other Sahelian leaders as making no serious effort to address the frustration that exists in ignored and marginalized parts of their states, according to analysts. Possibly, in reaching an accord with the Islamist fanatics, the government can dispense with the nuisance pretense of fairly administering a portion of the country that is of little interest to them, voluntarily offering a firm foothold to jihad which will inevitably begin to make further inroads.
The futile West hoping to save Muslims from the greater and graver human rights abuses of Shariah-led Islam. And while France invests itself in trying to save its former colonies from collapse into the hands of Islamist terrorism, it nurtures at home in its banlieues transposed Islamists hostile to French values and ideology and determined to transform France into a bastion of Islamist Shariah using whatever means and patience required to achieve their goal.
"We give the French invading forces and their henchmen glad tidings of more strikes with permission from Allah." "And what is coming is more grievous and bitter." "[Grad missiles target] French forces that invaded the lands of the Muslims." Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Timbuktu, Mali
SITE Photo distributed Nov. 29 by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, showing Grad missiles being fired at Timbuktu airport.
"[There were 228 al-Qaida-linked attacks
in the region in 2016, many in northern Mali.] This
represents a significant increase in the al Qaeda-led insurgency in
northern Mali since last year, which has also spilled over the borders
more frequently than the prior two years." The Long War Journal
It is primarily France that has committed to battling the Islamists in Mali. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has established its fighting forces in the region and it means to drive all western military powers from the area. France's military was successful in dispersing the Islamists from Timbuktu at a time when priceless religious heritage artefacts and sites were being looted and destroyed. But there is that about an religion-inspired ideology, it lives on and metastasizes.
Al-Qaeda is evidently not too proud to learn the strategies of public relations fundamentals from its rival Islamic State, and to that end it has posted photographs on social media showing two Grad missiles firing at Timbuktu airport targeting French forces. The UN peacekeeping office at Gao airport was destroyed in its turn, by a truck weighed down with explosives. While Ansar Dine, associated with AQIM, celebrated its attack on a French armoured vehicle with the use of a mine.
A UN truck parked in front of a peacekeeping forces camp on June 1, 2016 in Gao -- Getty Images
The message directed to France, will, it seems, soon be extended to Canada as it appears on the cusp of committing the contribution of 600 Canadian military and 150 police officers to Mali, to bolster the united Nations peacekeeping mission there. The Gao bombing was claimed by AQIM-linked Al Mourabitoun which, according to the Public Safety Canada website has a "goal ... to spread jihad across North Africa".
U.N. peacekeepers stand in front of a camp used by Chinese peacekeepers
in Gao, Mali, June 1. The camp was attacked by Al-Qaeda militants on
May 31, killing one Chinese soldier. STR/AFP/Getty Images
Mali crisis: France in big offensive against Islamists
BBC News online - 8 April 2013
French troops have found 340 artillery shells and high-calibre rocket
French forces have launched one their biggest offensives against militants in northern Mali, officials have said.
About 1,000 troops are sweeping through a river valley
believed to be a logistics base for the armed Islamists near Gao, AFP
news agency reports.
This is said to be the last major French-led operation before France starts reducing its military presence.
The militants have been driven out of northern cities and towns since France intervened militarily in January.
However, the Islamists have carried out several suicide
attacks in Gao, about 1,200 kilometres (750 miles) north of the capital
Bamako, and the ancient city of Timbuktu.
The BBC's West Africa correspondent
Thomas Fessy says the French offensive, called "Operation Gustav", is
intended to clear the Gao region of any militants still hiding there and
to prevent further attacks on the city.
France wants to search as much of the remote region as it can
for militant hideouts before it starts scaling down its troops from the
end of this month as this the kind of operation that African forces may
not be able to carry out once they take over, he says.
No Islamist fighters were encountered on the first day of the
operation, launched at dawn on Sunday, AFP quotes a journalist
travelling with the troops as reporting.
The French forces neutralised around 340 artillery shells and
high-calibre rockets found stashed under acacia trees in ravines, it
reports.
French soldiers will spend the coming days combing the 20km
valley with the help of Malian soldiers and police officers who will
first go into the nomad camps and mud houses which line the dry river
basin.
"We surrounded the valley north of Gao, which we believe
serves as a logistics base for jihadist groups, and we began to search
methodically," AFP quotes French land forces commander General Bernard
Barrera as saying.
"This is the fourth wadi [valley] we have gone into in the
Gao region. There will no doubt be other such operations but perhaps not
to the same extent."
France plans to start withdrawing the first of its 4,000
troops later this month, and hopes to have only 1,000 soldiers in Mali
by the end of the year.
The regional African force in Mali currently numbers about 6,300 soldiers.
UN chief Ban Ki-moon has suggested that a 11,000-strong UN
peace force, made up of African troops, be deployed in Mali, once France
reduces its presence.
Mr Ban also called for the creation of a second force to fight militants.
Remaining French troops could be part of this force, correspondents say.
French in Mali face Islamist insurgency of unknown strength
Insurgent raids into Timbuktu and Gao in supposedly secured northern
cities put a question mark over France's aspirations to wrap up its
military intervention in Mali soon.
A
Malian soldier walks in Gao, northern Mali, in early February. Timbuktu
has been hit by a prolonged battle between Islamic extremists and the
Malian and French armies, residents and a Malian military spokesman said
Sunday.
Jerome Delay/AP/File
Handfuls of Islamist radicals are slipping in and out of towns in northern Mali on hit and run operations, putting a question mark over France's aspirations to neatly wrap up its military intervention soon.
This weekend brought a suicide car bomb in Timbuktu
that rattled residents and sparked a brief, intense skirmish with
French and Malian troops who say they will now more strongly garrison
the ancient trading post town. The French deployed air craft to crack
down on rebels, whose identity in this attack remains unclear. Malian
officials said 21 rebels were killed.
As French politicians and senior officers prepare to partly exit Mali this month, having largely assuaged fears of a new Afghanistan developing in northeast Africa, they are facing a new low-level radical insurgency of yet uncertain numbers, capability, and intent.
"The fighting is heavy and it is ongoing," Malian Army Capt. Modibo Naman Traore told Reuters on Sunday, adding that the Army was in the process of "encircling" the militants.
Last week in Gao, the largest city in the Malian north, rebels killed
six locals in a similar attack. That operation, which French forces
reportedly rebuffed quickly, was claimed by the Movement for Oneness and
Jihad in West Africa, a group that partly controlled the city last fall.
In
January the French quickly drove out a loose but effective Islamist
insurgency that last year took over huge swaths of Mali using weapons
siphoned out of Libya after its civil strife ended.
But
having liberated Gao, Timbuktu, and other northern towns, the French
have focused on Islamists in the northern mountains; days back French
forces confirmed killing a significant rebel leader Abou Zeid. Yet apparent French indifference to, or even collaboration in recent weeks with, ethnic Tuareg rebels, reported here by Peter Tinti in The Christian Science Monitor, has strained relations between government, military, and local populations.
Much of the media coverage and information of sensitive war operations in Mali by the French is under strict control. The New York Times today, reporting out of Paris, writes about the rebels in Timbuktu that,
“They
had said Timbuktu was secured,” the mayor [of Timbuktu] lamented. The
fighting had ceased by about 3 p.m. on Sunday, he said, though military
aircraft, presumably French, continued to circle in the skies above
Timbuktu. Two patrols of French fighter aircraft had been sent to
Timbuktu, according to Colonel Burkhard, the military spokesman, but
they did not fire any munitions.
Analysts continue to ask whether, after a successful effort to put Al Qaeda-linked rebels on the run, Mali itself can continue to hold together.
Mali
has announced new elections in July and the French force levels are to
draw down from more than 4,000 to 2,000 by that time.
The SITE Intelligence Group has reported that Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) has appealed for new recruits from North African
countries in its fight against what it said was France's "Crusader"
campaign in Mali.
The global jihad monitoring company stated that the appeal was posted
on websites used by AQIM on Saturday 16th March and urged Islamist
terrorists being pursued by their governments to join Al Qaeda fighters
battling French-led forces in Mali or Algeria.
France launched a ground and air operation in Mali in January this year
in an attempt to break Islamist rebels' hold on the region. French
officials have stated that the terrorists pose a risk to the security of
West Africa and Europe.
The call to arms however looks increasingly desperate as AQIM come
under further pressure from local authorities and international
intervention. The statement reads:
"The front of the Islamic Maghreb today is in direst need of the
support of the sons of Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania, to
thwart the attack of Crusader France and defeat its agents in the
region, and empower the Islamic project." (Translation of the statement
emailed by SITE).
AQIM qualified its call to action by stating that if Islamist youths in
North Africa could have a greater impact in their own countries, they
should stay to fight secularism and push for the imposition of
sharia-based rule.
France's offensive has wrested northern Mali from Islamist occupation
and killed scores of fighters. Other rebels have retreated into mountain
caves and desert hiding places stocked with arms and supplies.
The Algerian army in January killed at least 32 Al Qaeda-linked
terrorists in an assault to end a siege at a desert gas plant in which
23 hostages were killed, many of them foreigners.
Islamist militant Mokhtar Belmokhtar 'killed in Mali'
BBC News online - 2 March 2013
Thomas Fessy : "There is a lot of confusion in the aftermath of the attack".
Islamist militant Mokhtar Belmokhtar has been killed by Chadian soldiers in Mali, Chad's armed forces say.
His death was announced on Chadian state television but has not been confirmed by other sources.
Mokhtar Belmokhtar is a former al-Qaeda leader said to have
ordered January's attack on an Algerian gas plant where at least 37
hostages were killed.
Chadian troops are fighting Islamist militants in Mali as part of an international force led by France.
"Chadian forces in Mali completely destroyed the main
jihadist base in the Adrar de Ifhogas mountains... killing several
terrorists including leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar," the army statement on
Chadian TV said.
Weapons, equipment and 60 vehicles were seized, it added.
Analysis
Thomas FessyBBC West Africa correspondent
This is the second big claim in two days coming from Chad.
First Abu Zeid, now Mokhtar Belmokhtar. There is no other confirmation
that these two top jihadi commanders have been killed. President Deby is probably keen for a reward after he sent
nearly 2,000 soldiers to the front line. But certainly the Chadians are
well aware that such reports won't go unnoticed. Abu Zeid is known as
the most ruthless al-Qaeda field commander in the region - he is
believed to have executed at least two European hostages in recent
years. Mokhtar Belmokhtar claimed responsibility for the spectacular
attack on a gas facility in Algeria in January. If confirmed, their deaths won't mean the war in Mali is
over, but it will certainly be a big loss for jihadi fighters hiding in
the mountains bordering Algeria. The French army doesn't even know how
many fighters they are up against there. More worrying is the fate of
several foreign hostages who are believed to be in the two men's
custody.
If confirmed, the death would be a
major blow to Islamist militants in Mali, the BBC's West Africa
correspondent Thomas Fessy says.
Reports of the killing came a day after Chadian President
Idriss Deby said the country's forces killed al-Qaeda militant
Abdelhamid Abou Zeid during clashes in northern Mali.
Abou Zeid - whose death is still to be confirmed by DNA
evidence - is said to be second-in-command of al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM), which is fighting foreign forces in Mali.
The French military - which is leading the military offensive in northern Mali - has not confirmed either death.
On Friday French President Francois Hollande said the operation was in its final stages.
Islamist militants took refuge in the remote mountains in
northern Mali, close to the Algerian border, after being forced out of
the main towns and cities by French troops backed by jets and
helicopters.
Mali's army and troops from several African countries have also been involved in the fighting.
Islamist rebels took control of northern Mali a year ago after a military coup in the capital Bamako, in the south.
Veteran Islamist Mokhtar Belmokhtar
Claims to have travelled to Afghanistan at the age of 19 to get military training from al-Qaeda
Returned to Algeria in 1993 and lost an eye fighting in the bloody conflict between Islamists and government forces
Joined al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, but later formed his own group after infighting
Blamed for kidnapping and smuggling across the Sahara region
Claimed responsibility for the attack on an Algerian gas plant at In Amenas where at least 37 hostages were killed
France intervened militarily in January amid fears they were preparing to advance on Bamako.
'Mr Marlboro'
Algerian-born Mokhtar Belmokhtar has been fighting as an Islamist militant for more than two decades.
He claimed to have received military training in Afghanistan
before returning to Algeria, where he lost an eye fighting in the
Islamist insurgency in the 1990s.
He then joined AQIM - which operates across the Sahara - before breaking off to lead his own group.
The attack on the In Amenas gas plant in Algeria - which he
claims he was behind - was his group's first large-scale armed attack.
He is also known as "Mr Marlboro" because of his alleged role in cigarette smuggling in the region.
Mokhtar Belmokhtar and Abu Zeid have also been involved in numerous kidnappings.
If confirmed, their deaths raise concerns about the fate of
several foreign hostages believed to be in their power, our
correspondent says.
A senior leader of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has
been killed in northern Mali: Algeria-based Ennahar television reported
on Thursday.
The station said 40 militants including Abu Zeid were killedin the
region of Tigargara in northern Mali three days ago. A French Defense
Ministry official declined to comment on the report. Algeria did not
confirm the killing.
France launched a whirlwind assault to retake Mali's vast northern
desert region from AQIM and other Islamist rebels on Jan. 11 after a
plea from Mali's caretaker government. The military intervention
dislodged the rebels from several main towns they had occupied and drove
them back into desert wilds.
Overwhelmed by the superior fire-power of the French air force and
special forces, Islamist hardliners in northern Mali pulled out of the
towns they had ruthlessly ruled for nine months, imposing an extreme
form of sharia law.
They regrouped and reverted to guerrilla tactics, launching hit-and-run
attacks against French or pro-government forces and resorting to suicide
attacks.
AQIM has earned tens of millions of dollars in ransom payments for Western hostages taken to its strongholds in northern Mali.
Abu Zeid has been regarded as one of AQIM's most ruthless operators. He
is believed to have executed British national Edwin Dyer in 2009 and a
78-year-old Frenchman, Michel Germaneau, in 2010.
Canadian diplomat Robert Fowler, in an account of his kidnapping by
another Islamist cell in the Sahara, recounted how Abou Zeid refused to
give medication to two hostages suffering from dysentery, one of whom
had been stung by a scorpion.
North and north-west Africa represent a hotbed of tribal rebellions overlaid with lividly-obnoxious Islamism.
From Sudan to Somalia, Algeria to Mali, Libya and Egypt, reflecting
other Muslim and Middle East countries like Iraq, Iran, Syria and
Lebanon, Islamism
appears unstoppable. Its malign ideology and militant politics has
unsettled vast tracts of geography. And in the struggle to overcome
opposition from reigning tyrants, theocracies, sheikdoms and dictators
traditional in that world, brutal atrocities have proliferated.
The
West felt itself compelled to present a united front of opposition
against the broad march of violent jihad. Earlier bloody messages in the
form of attacks against western embassies and military installations
gave warning, but the full alarm failed to be raised until the attacks
on the United States of 9/11, when the world was given full notice that Islamism had successfully infiltrated homeland defences.
In
a self-protective collaborative approach the West responded
collectively combining their military forces to launch their own
reprisal attack against al-Qaeda
and rout it along with their host, the Afghan Taliban from Afghanistan.
What has never been solved in the quest to combat an ideology so
invested in violence and mass murder to deliver a message of determined
mass conquest, was how to fully squelch the movement itself.
The more it presents as a religious political ideology, the greater the backlash from among all the ummah, the great Muslim collective, who have been convinced and manipulated to believe that "Islamophobia" motivates the response from the West, attacked by violent jihadists, not the threats and bloodshed emanating from the fanatics within their community.
And
that belief leads to the successful recruitment of young Muslim men
into the war on the non-Islamic world. Recruits deliver themselves to
the training grounds in Afghanistan, Somalia, Pakistan, Algeria, Morocco
and elsewhere. They become infused with the ideology of revenge and
sacrifice, skilled in the manufacture of bombs and the use of firearms
and set out to wage war.
And there are those recruited
from Europe and North America where as part of the larger immigrant
community, they were born and educated and socialized, but never severed
from tradition and heritage. The opportunity to return back to those
countries of their citizenship and wreak havoc there for the greater
glory of violent jihad in Islamism finds countries like Spain and England, France, Holland, Indonesia and the United States waiting targets.
In
an effort to prevent the firestorm of jihad from invading Western
shores it seemed reasonable for the West to take itself to the crucible
of the violence. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Libya, where foreign
forces became mired in a costly and time-consuming struggle to contain
the flood by maintaining the dikes. But it proved to be a temporary
solution, since there is never a shortage of new recruits.
So
should Canada join France in Mali in the hopes that by aspiring to
destroy the ambitions of jihad our own shores will be protected? Works
in theory, not so much in practise. We have more than ample evidence of
that, having left Afghanistan after over a decade of involvement with
little to show other than temporary advances in civilized facade
overlaying the medieval cultural scaffolding.
Afghanistan
involvement solved little; from failing to entice farmers to grow
edible crops instead of poppies whose sale benefited both war lords and
the Taliban, to persuading tribal cultures that the education of females
would result in huge benefits for the entire society. Involvement in unseating Libya's Moammar Ghadafi brought self-congratulations, and eventually the invasion of Mali by Islamist forces armed with looted Libyan munitions.
Libya
remains mired in tribal and sectarian misery with the central
government incapable of cementing a global administration and of
accomplishing its primary task of disarming the tribal militias. And the
arms depots that had been pilfered during the Libyan revolution enabled
the Tuareg to return to Mali as trained mercenaries prepared to fight
for their sovereignty, pairing with Islamists to contain northern Mali for their own.
Canada
invested treasury in Mali, and its military trained Malian military in
the hopes that it would succeed in helping that country to become a
robust democracy. And then the Malian military marched in a coup to
unseat the democratic government, finding itself no more capable than
the government it faulted in dealing with the Tuareg rebellion. And
calling upon France for help finally, when it feared Bamako would be
invaded by Islamists.
With
the experience of Iraq - at a remove - and Afghanistan from close
encounters, along with Libya and its fallout, is there really any need
for Canada to involve itself deeply once again in African/Islamic
affairs, since nothing any foreign intervention attempts to achieve
seems to come to any meaningful conclusion?
We've
seen Afghanistan close up and personal. Canada, like other NATO
countries, responded to the U.S. call to arms, sanctified by the United
Nations in a world reeling at the malevolence of a religious political
ideology that brought us a kind of tragic-horror theatre that none could
have imagined being cleverly mounted with the audaciously lethal attack
on the United States by al-Qaeda operatives.
Afghanistan,
a country of barbaric backwardness, tribally ferocious and religiously
fanatic, was steeping in the vividly nasty juices of fanatical Islam.
Another fanatically Islamic country was involved in contriving that
Afghanistan would remain in the clutches of the Taliban, whom Pakistan
had involved itself in funding, sheltering, training and arming. Aided
covertly, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, by the U.S. CIA.
Of
all the Islamic countries of the world, Pakistan likely represents the
most neurotically paranoid. In invading Afghanistan, NATO forces came to
understand that its neighbour, Pakistan, which declared itself a
committed supporter of Western determination to battle the forces of
terrorism, and whose greed for American financial support ensured it
parroted the resolve to secure Afghanistan against jihadism, fuelled the very terrorists it claimed to detest.
The collaboration of NATO and UN-aligned forces along with international NGOs
to build a better country for Afghans out of the ruins left by the
Taliban seemed as though it was destined for success. At huge cost to
the West of treasury and the lives of their military personnel, the
realization gradually dawned that nothing was going to really change
Afghanistan; the culture was deeply engrained with tribal and religious fundamentalism.
All
the NATO and UN-allied forces were eager to depart that sad dead-end
trap of failed aspirations. Just as intervention in Iraq with an
invasion that toppled a murderous dictator led to the ouster of Saddam
and his minority Baath
party, and despite the presence of thousands of Western military
personnel, unleashed a brutal storm of hatred and bloodshed between
Sunni and Shiite gave some indication of the interrelated difficulties
inherent in reconciling such societies toward democracy, we have the
added complications of the Arab Spring.
Tunisia, Libya,
Egypt, Syria, Bahrain have all been altered significantly by an Arab
and Muslim re-awakening. One that the West celebrated as surely an
indication that the greater populations of all those countries clamoured
for freedom, liberty, liberal democracy. When in fact, the greater
majority given the opportunity, just as occurred in the Palestinian
Territories, voted for Islamism and elevated Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists to the fore.
In the ongoing bloodshed in Syria we see through breathless news coverage of atrocities committed by the Alawite Baath regime of President al-Assad
the classic collision between an Arab Muslim tyrant and an oppressed
population. And lurking behind the protests of the oppressed, awaiting
their opportunity to aid and assist the civil-war-protest of the Sunni
majority are the ranks of the tried-and-true Islamist militias.
From Sudan to Somalia, Algeria to Mali, Islamist terrorism is on the march, as well. The French have taken the initiative in Mali where jihadists have been so hugely benefited by the fall of Libyan tyrant Moammar Ghadafi to take possession of looted weapons depots. Groups associated with al-Qaeda, sharing that fascist ideology of Islamist dominated Sharia imposition have been temporarily routed.
An Ansar Dine member near Timbuktu
Just as Hamas, Hezbollah, the Taliban have receded with a hudna, so too have the Malian Islamists.
They lurk in the background, patiently awaiting opportunity. To rearm,
to feint, to draw back again, to threaten and to observe. And when those
who seek to counteract their malign presence finally withdraw, their
opportunity to resume their ascent resumes.
The Islamists destroyed heritage buildings, ancient mausoleums located in Timbuktu, treasured by the people of Mali, and representing world heritage sites. They destroyed part of an ancient mosque. These are architectural treasures of ancient Islamic tradition that are irreplaceable. Irreplaceable also the ancient manuscripts that were destroyed as representative of idolatrous worship, claimed to be haram by the upholders of fundamentalist Islamist traditions.
Forbidden by an Islam that permits no permutations, no other versions, however ancient, of the purity of Islamic worship. What al-Qaeda's northern African branch did not destroy was a two-story building purpose-built as a military training centre for the Malian military, in that fabled ancient city. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb recognized its potential for use as a sophisticawted training centre. And saw great value in maintaining it for their own purposes.
They operated this training centre for nine months, gathering to it recruits from across the Muslim world, prepared to assume their place as jihadists for the greater glory of Islam. There were Malians, Pakistanis, Algerians and Muritanians, along with Nigerians, members of Boko Haram. Mali's security forces' loss in the facilities represented AQIM's gain.
For the Malian army it was local headquarters of the Gendarmerie Nationale, a paramilitary unit. For AQIM it was a fortuitous training centre, ringed by a perimter fence topped with barbed wire. A valuable hub for the training of AQIM's new recruits. "Every day, new recruits would come; perhaps one or two, or more, every day", said Faraj Mohammed Arbi, a man from Timbuktu who worked there as a cook and cleaner.
There were two Algerians, one as commander in charge,the otherhis deputy responsible for weapons training. A Pakistani was placed in charge of maintaining the armoury. The armoury included heavy machine guns and AK-47 assault rifles, along with Toyota Land Cruisers and other 4x4s. The Pakistani's specialty was fitting machine guns to the vehicles.
There was a rigid protocol followed every day in the training camp. Prayers at 5 a.m., then physical exercise in military uniforms of desert print camouflage carrying AK047s, running five laps of the camp's perimeter fence, then press-ups. Prayers again at 7 a.m., then target practise followed by marksmanship with AK-47s and heavy machine guns.
A break until prayers at 12:30 p.m. followed by lunch and formal lessons of religious and ideological indoctrination. Prayers at 4 p.m. and again at 7 p.m., when experienced trainees would guard the centre overnight. It is no longer in operation. Wrecked, shattered, pulverized by two French bombs during the initial attacks by French combat planes over Timbuktu on January 10.
By then it had been emptied of recruits, the lights switched on by the evacuees to invite French bombs as a diversion while the Islamists made themselves scarce.
That didn't take long, did it? As soon as the French military and the several thousand African troops that joined them in routing the Islamic radicals - comprised of Ansar Dine, The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb militias - from Timbuktu, Goa and Kidal in northern Mali, retreating in victory, back came black-robed Islamists with their extremist vision of a global Caliphate.
Armed with AK-47 automatic rifles they returned to launch a surprise attack on Gao with its population of 90,000, two weeks after the withdrawal of the French troops, leaving protection of the city to the Malian army. Combat took place in downtown Gao and continued into the night, with the sounds of gunfire eventually giving way to French military helicopters clattering above. The Islamists are not prepared to abandon their plan to establish themselves permanently in northern Mali.
Families hid in their homes as the jihadists fought the Malian army in the narrow streets of central Gao, and up on rooftops, sniping at the military. These are hardened fighters, skilled in combat and well armed, forecasting what is to com; a protracted campaign to restore their ownership of the vast tract of Saharan geography for their own, where Sharia is to be permanently installed, and spread further afield as the territory increasingly succumbs to their control.
These are not the skirmishes which have taken place between the Islamists and the Malian army that have taken place on the outskirts of Goa, since the Islamists were routed by the French. This represented a successful entry of the armed terrorists into the centre of the strategic city to which not all its residents have yet returned after having fled the stifling, frightening atmosphere of Sharia with its public floggings and punishing amputations.
The Islamists left their strategic retreats dug into desert hideouts to resume challenging the government of Mali. Crossing the Niger River to penetrate Gao, they took the less determined, poorly trained and inadequately armed Malian troops by surprise. Islamist leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar who had been gratified at taking possession of looted Libyan weaponry has taken credit for the Algerian In Amenas gas refinery attack.
And he had been present in Gao earlier, staying in a two-story house the militants took possession of last year when they captured Gao, maintaining this one in particular, a luxurious accommodation, for the comfort of their commanders. There were other, more fundamental houses that were commissioned from their rightful owners that the militants assumed for themselves.
Several suicide bombers had exploded themselves on the outskirts of Gao before the latest invasion of the central area. "I am really afraid. You hear about these kinds of things in Pakistan or Afghanistan", a 30-year old resident of Gao, astride a motorcycle said, at the scene of the two suicide bombings. "Gao is becoming like Pakistan."
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